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Understanding Patriarchy, Past and Present: Critical reflections on Gerda Lerner (1987), The 
Creation of Patriarchy, Oxford University Press. 
 
I first read Gerda Lerner’s The Creation of Patriarchy in the 1990s as a post graduate student 
in history in the University of Delhi. It is one of the major influences in my academic life, 
and coming to it, two decades later, still speaks to me and the work I now do on violence 
against women. Her writing style is clear, cogent, yet scholarly. Gerda Lerner wrote her book 
after years of painstaking research into the historical creation of the concept of patriarchy, 
and most significantly, links her research to women’s liberation. In her own words: 
“Women’s history is indispensible and essential to the emancipation of 
women” (Lerner, 1986: 1) 
Gerda Lerner: the past and the present 
Rereading Lerner in 2016, her core argument for me is that male dominance over women is 
not “natural” or biological, but the product of historical developments, that she traces from 
the second millennium B.C. in the Ancient Near East. Since patriarchy as a system of 
organising society was established historically, she contends, it can also be ended by 
historical processes. She goes back to the cultures of the earliest known civilizations – those 
of the ancient Near East – to discover the origins of the major gender metaphors of Western 
civilization. Using historical, literary, archaeological, and artistic evidence, she then traces 
the development of these ideas, symbols, and metaphors and their incorporation into Western 
civilization as the basis of patriarchal gender relations. Lerner explains that patriarchy is a 
historical creation formed by men and women in a process that took nearly 2500 years to its 
completion, and looks at how gender became created, defined and established. This was first 
manifested in the archaic state, and reflected in the patriarchal family. She suggests that the 
roots of patriarchy rested in biological structures (human dependence on mothers for survival 
in early infancy before the development of alternate forms of feeding, for example), but while 
this was an evolutionary necessity at the time, it cannot be treated as an ontological truth for 
all times.  
She also argues that the enslavement of women within male dominant contexts, combining 
both racism and sexism, preceded the formation of classes and class oppression.  She goes 
beyond single explanations, and is interested in 'various, intersecting and mutually 
reinforcing processes' that strengthened male dominance (Lerner, 1986: 57-58). She traces 
the shifts from cults of the mother goddess in Neolithic periods to the contradiction between 
the power of the goddesses with the increasing societal constraints upon the lives of most 
women in ancient Mesopotamia, and finally the transition to polytheism (including powerful 
goddesses) to monotheism (single male god) in Biblical and Greek times. As she rightly 
points out: 
The development of monotheism in the Book of Genesis was an enormous advance in 
the direction of abstract thought and the definition of universally valid symbols. It is a 
tragic accident that this advance occurred in a social setting and under circumstances 
that strengthened and affirmed patriarchy. (Lerner, 1986: 198)  
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Lerner’s work offers much to the contemporary reader, and here, I will look at two key areas 
that remain important within debates on gender and gender based violence. Firstly, the 
reification of women’s sexuality and reproduction in their subordination. Secondly, the 
complicity of women in their own oppression, and the oppression of other women. 
Throughout this discussion, I will also explore whether Lerner’s theorisations on the creation 
of patriarchy in western society has resonance in non-western worlds, or whether we need an 
alternate vision. The final section will further explore the ramifications of the reification of 
women’s sexuality and reproduction.  
The reification of women’s sexuality and reproduction 
The concept of the reification of women based on the ‘exchange of women’ was introduced 
by anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1969: 115). He argued that the ‘exchange of women’ in tribal 
societies is based on rules governing and prohibiting endogamy, and the socialisation of 
women to accept forced marriages, and that within this kind of marital relationships, marriage 
is not between the couple, “…but between two groups of men, and the woman figures only as 
one of the objects in the exchange, not as one of the partners” (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 115). He 
further argues that within this exchange, women’s consent is irrelevant and meaningless, as 
even where women may be seen as consenting, they cannot alter the inherent nature of this 
exchange, or what we may call the inherent power dynamics within which they are treated as 
exchangeable.  
Lerner argues, however, that it is not women in themselves who are reified and commodified, 
but it is women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity, that is their ability to bear and birth 
children. If we accept that law reflects gender relations in society, we can take the example of 
Mesopotamian law. Lerner carefully traced marriage law, and analyses Hammurabic law, 
where within marriage, women were treated as the sexual property of the husband, and if a 
woman was adulterous, her husband could choose to forgive or punish his wife or not. In 
contrast, men could freely commit adultery with slave women. Middle Assyrian Law further 
elucidates the evolution of the family, giving fathers absolute ownership over children and 
family. Class and hierarchy remain organic in this functioning, and within this control of 
female sexuality, different rules of behaviour operated over different classes of women, 
therefore (and echoing recent edicts and debates about veiling) wives and daughters of  
respectable men had to be veiled in public, and ‘harlots’ were not permitted to be publically 
veiled. The predominant family structure in the Biblical narrative continued to be the 
patriarchal family.  
Rape law incorporated the principle that the injured party in a rape case was not the woman 
herself, but her husband or father, similarly pointing to the way in which women’s sexuality 
was owned by the patriarch. If a virgin was raped by a married man, Hammurabic law 
allowed the father of the women to ‘take the wife of the ravisher... (and) give her to be 
dishonoured; he shall not give her (back) to their husband (but) shall take her’ (cited in 
Lerner, 1986: 116). If the rapist was unmarried, he had to marry the virgin after paying the 
father bride price. Lerner then traces patriarchal dominance from private practice to public 
law in Mesopotamian law and argues how it has continued resonance in the United States in 
the 1980s (Lerner, 1986: 122).  
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Arguably, the reification of women’s sexuality in law is also apparent currently in other 
contexts and periods, for example, the absence of the criminalisation of marital rape in 
several countries in the world currently, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, India, Pakistan and Yemen. In India, attempts to criminalise marital rape 
particularly in the 1980 and in 2012 have been unsuccessful, and male ownership of women 
in marriage is further strengthened in civil marriage laws. For instance, civil marriage laws 
have differential minimum age of marriage for women and men (18 years for women and 21 
for men), which confirms the socially maintained hierarchy of age and experience. The 
mainstream Hindu cultural expectation in marriage is that of male hypogamy and female 
hypergamy, therefore men are expected to be older, have social experience, maturity, and 
hence can be dominant in relation to their wives. The law also reflects the social and cultural 
concern for confining the sexuality of young women within marriage as soon as she attains 
sexual maturity (Fruzetti 1982). Sexual control of husbands over wives is similarly 
emphasised in the adultery law (Section 497 IPC), which is a part of the criminal law. 
According to Section 497 IPC: 
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is, and whom he knows or 
has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or 
connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence 
of rape is guilty of the offence of adultery (Section 497 IPC). 
Section 497 therefore punishes the man who has a sexual relationship with a married woman, 
not a woman who has a sexual relation outside marriage. A 1985 Supreme Court judgment 
explicated the logic of the act: 
The law only makes a specific kind of extra marital relationship an offence...the 
relationship between a man and a married woman...the legislature is entitled to 
deal with the evil where it is felt and seen the most, (that is in the case of) a man 
seducing the wife of another (Soumitra Vishnu V. Union of India 1985, 1618). 
 
This has been reinforced in later judgements as in the case of V. Revathi v. Union of India 
(1988), in which the Court held that the man was the seducer and not the woman. The adultery 
law in India is a throwback to Brahmanical patriarchy, because in the Hindu scriptures, the 
very word for adultery is ‘connection with another man’s wife’ (Abraham 1987,16). The 
inferences that we can draw from this law are twofold. One that the man owns his wife sexually, 
and his consent is necessary to gain sexual access over her. Second, the offence of adultery is 
legally equivalent to that of theft, the goods being the wife’s body. Women are therefore denied 
agency, whether they themselves have committed adultery (as understood generally) or are 
married to men committing adultery. Where Indian laws recognise women’s sexual agency 
within marriage, it is constructed as being dangerous. Maintenance and custody laws under 
different civil and criminal provisions provide for the rescinding of maintenance order or loss 
of custody of children if the woman can be proven to be ‘unchaste’ (HMA 1955, Section 25 
(3); SMA 1954, Section37 (3); Parsee Marriage and Divorce Act 1937, Section 40 (3); Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, Section 18 (3); Section 125 (5) CrPC).   
 
To summarise so far, Lerner suggests that it is women’s sexuality and ability to procreate that 
is reified and commodified, and not women themselves, they have agency in themselves (in 
contrast to Levi-Strauss’ bleaker view of women’s ability to consent or not), and this that gives 
women, ‘no matter how exploited and abused’ power to act and choose to the same, often very 
limited extent, as men of their group (Lerner, 1986:213-4). The next section will explore how 
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this agency may have been used by women to further patriarchal interests, even where it may 
have harmed themselves, and other women. 
 
Section 2: The Complicit woman 
One of the key messages from Lerner is that women have historically been complicit in their 
own oppression, and in the symbolic and material oppression of other women.  Lerner points 
out that at different historical periods, some women were necessarily vested with more power 
than other women and some men, even though the power they enjoyed was mediated through 
men, and was most often exercised to fulfil male agenda. She looks at exceptional women in 
Mesopotamia and the development of the role of royal wife and daughter as "stand in" for her 
husband and father (Lerner, 1986: 68). In her own words: 
Some of the Mari documents offer a vivid picture of the lives and activities of the 
royal ladies in their role as their male relatives’ deputies. The queen, the king’s first 
wife, held independent power in palace, temple and workshops and served as a stand-
in for the king when he was absent in warfare or diplomatic missions. In her own right 
she managed her property and supervised the female palace personnel (Lerner, 1986: 
69).  
Lerner cautions against celebrating this instance of female independence, and points out the 
queen’s power “…like that of the male vassal, depended on the will and whim of the 
king…only in her lord’s protection was there any safety for her” (Lerner, 1986: 70). One is 
reminded here of women who have historically acted as male proxies, and have derived 
power from male relatives, dead or alive. For instance, wives of land owners in England in 
the period of the Crusades, that led John Knox to lament about the ‘Monstrous Regiment of 
Women’ in 1558, where he argued that rule by females is contrary to the Bible. I am also 
thinking of Rani Lakshmibai, who came to power in nineteenth century India after being 
widowed, and fought against British imperialism in the 1857 revolt. The highest praise 
awarded to Rani Lakshmibai was: “How valiantly like a man fought she / The Rani of Jhansi 
/ On every parapet a gun she set / Raining fire of hell / How well like a man fought the Rani 
of Jhansi / How valiantly and well!” (cited in Mayer and Brysac, 1999), and versions of this 
poem are still taught in Indian schools. Similarly, more recently South Asian countries have 
been led by women, for example Indira Gandhi in India (three terms as Prime Minister 
between 1966 – 1984), Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (two terms as Prime Minister between 
1988 – 1996), and the recent electoral victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’ in Myanmar (2015). 
These three women derived their power and prestige from their association with their family, 
and as a commentator has pointed out: 
“Suu Kyi, like other dynastic female leaders, promised to cleanse the soiled public 
realm with private, familial virtue. Suu Kyi is often called ‘sister Suu’ by her 
supporters. Other female leaders have similarly been called ‘aunts’ or ‘mothers’.” 
(Thompson, 2015). 
Lerner also gives the example of the enslavement of women, where powerful women were 
necessarily complicit with the subordination of other women. Within Mesopotamian society, 
she looks at Queen Shibtu, who acted as her husband’s deputy during his absences, and also 
carried out his instructions with regard to female captives he was sending home after war: 
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The wife’s cooperation in the matter is taken from granted, and her husband’s sexual 
use of the captive women, which served not only to gratify his pleasure but to enhance 
his property and status, is assumed to be a routine matter (Lerner, 1986: 71) 
Biblical narratives of Genesis (1200-500 BC) also provide examples of women’s complicity 
in enslaving and subordinating other women through the use of rape and sexual abuse. Lerner 
points to the childless Sarai and Rachel urging their husbands to have sex with their 
respective handmaids in order that they have children.  
There are several underlying assumptions implicit in these accounts: a slave woman 
owes sexual services to her mistress’s husband, and the offspring of such intercourse 
counts as though it were the offspring of her mistress (Lerner, 1986: 92). 
Margaret Atwood’s fascinating futurist novel, the Handmaid’s Tale (1985) looks at how this 
Biblical narrative might be used to control women’s sexuality and reproduction, if women’s 
fertility was reduced drastically, either due to their own actions, or wider environmental 
reasons. In this novel, set in imaginary Gilead, women who have proved their fertility by 
having children in the past, but have been adulterous or divorced, are captured and made 
Handmaids to powerful men and their barren wives, in order that they may produce children 
through rape. In Atwood’s own words: 
The Handmaid's Tale has often been called a "feminist dystopia", but that term is not 
strictly accurate. In a feminist dystopia pure and simple, all of the men would have 
greater rights than all of the women. It would be two-layered in structure: top layer 
men, bottom layer women. But Gilead is the usual kind of dictatorship: shaped like a 
pyramid, with the powerful of both sexes at the apex, the men generally outranking 
the women at the same level; then descending levels of power and status with men 
and women in each, all the way down to the bottom, where the unmarried men must 
serve in the ranks before being awarded an Econowife (Atwood, 2012). 
Lerner has also argued that the oppression of women within the family ‘antedates slavery and 
makes it possible’ (Lerner, 1986: 77), and that the ‘invention of slavery’ involves the 
development of techniques of permanent enslavement and of the concept, in the dominant 
and the dominated, that permanent powerlessness on the one side, and total power on the 
other are acceptable conditions of social interaction (pp.78).  
Lerner’s explanatory framework can help feminist scholars to understand why women 
continue to participate in their own oppression, and the subjugation of other women. This is 
an issue that I am particularly interested in, , especially mother-in-law to daughter-in-law 
violence and abuse in the specific context of South Asian women’s violence against other 
women in the same household, and mothers forcing daughters to marry, and being culpable in 
abuse against daughters seen as dishonouring their family (Rew et al. 2013), or in war and 
communal riots (Gangoli and Rew, 2011; Gangoli, 2006)  inducing and encouraging men 
from their community to sexually abuse and violate women from the ‘enemy’ community.  
Elsewhere we have argued that women’s violence against other women in South Asian 
contexts can be seen as fulfilling what Kandiyoti (1988) calls the ‘patriarchal bargain’, as 
women as mothers of sons derive power within the household, but only as long as they are 
seen as acting in male interests (Rew et al. 2013).  They are aware that their power is 
precarious and is based on training future generations of women (daughters and daughters in 
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law) to maintain the patriarchal order, and in ignoring, if not actively facilitating, sexual 
violence against socially inferior women from other communities and groups. 
 
Conclusion 
Gerda Lerner’s work is of continuing value and resonance to those of us interested in 
understanding the resonant and seemingly indestructible nature of patriarchal dominance, 
including violence against women, and in looking for ways to end it. As we have seen, Lerner 
systematically traces the origins of patriarchy in western societies through the control of 
women’s reproductive abilities and their sexuality by men. This control is legitimised through 
social norms, the law, the State and religion, and therefore appears impervious to change, and 
seemingly eternal. Lerner points out that women have also been complicit in the creation, the 
entrenchment and the continuation of patriarchy, and one of the ways in which this has been 
done is by ensuring that women feel allegiance to their families, communities and nations, 
rather than to other women.  
Women have for millennia participated in the process of their own subordination 
because they have been psychologically shaped as to internalise the idea of their own 
inferiority…The connectedness of women to familial structures made any 
development of female solidarity and group cohesiveness extremely problematic 
(Lerner, 1986: 218).  
Lerner points out that women have historically been seen as irrelevant from “the human 
endeavour of abstract thought” (Lerner, 1986, 224), and their feelings/experiences have been 
devalued. Intellectual women have had to first learn “how to think like a man” (Lerner, 1986: 
224). She cautions that the only way forward to end patriarchy is by rejecting patriarchal 
thought, logic and theories, and to reorder the world by “being sceptical towards every known 
system of thought; being critical of all assumptions; ordering values and definitions” (Lerner, 
1986: 228). As feminists, we have to question everything. 
While Lerner based her analysis on western society, we have seen that her insights can be 
used to understand the origins and establishment of patriarchal dominance in non-western 
societies, particularly as explored in this article, in India. In India, as in other parts of the 
world, patriarchy is operated through male control over women’s sexuality, and the 
complicity of women within this system, both over themselves, and over other women. These 
are important questions for feminist practitioners and scholars today. The current political 
and social situation at a global level of terrorism, the economic recession and economic 
hardships continues to be challenging, not only for women’s rights (and women have been 
disproportionately and detrimentally affected by these global events), but for other 
marginalised groups, including for instance, in the UK: refugee and asylum seekers, LGBTQ 
communities, working class people. How can feminists work with other social issues, such as 
LGBTQ rights, disability, class whilst prioritising gender based violence? In other words, 
how do intersectional politics work in practice? Lerner ends her book with these words, 
eventually optimistic. These might still be relevant, or at the very least, still inspirational: 
The system of patriarchy is a historical construct; it has a beginning; it will have an 
end. Its time seems to have nearly run its course – it no longer serves the needs of 
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men or women and in its inextricable linkage to militarism, hierarchy, and racism it 
threatens the very existence of life on earth (Lerner, 1986: 228-9). 
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